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Form Over Function: How Collins v. Yellen Signals a
Threat to the Independence of Multimember Financial
Regulatory Agencies
I. INTRODUCTION
Independent agencies of the federal government, longestablished and well-studied,1 are purposed by Congress2 to mediate the
“competing political forces” of the legislative and executive branches.3
In the realm of financial regulation, this statutory independence is critical:
“[o]ften, Congress has granted financial regulators such independence in
order to bolster public confidence that financial policy is guided by longterm thinking, not short-term political expediency.”4 This Note
highlights the consequences of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2021 decision
in Collins v. Yellen for the independence of multimember agencies—
those independent agencies headed and run by several commissioners.5
Agencies of the executive branch are subject to the “principle that
Article II [of the U.S. Constitution] confers on the President ‘the general
administrative control of those executing the laws.’”6 In other words, the
head of the executive branch enjoys broad authority to determine who
helps to run the executive branch.7 But that authority—including the
1. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 37 DUKE
L.J. 257, 257 (1988) (“The independent agency has been around for 100 years now . . . .”).
2. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED
STATES: LAW, STRUCTURE, AND POLITICS 6 (2006) (“When Congress chooses to use the phrase
‘independent agency in the executive branch,’ or other some such, when it creates an agency
or commission, that phrase certainly suggests congressional desire that the agency be
independent of the president, but it has no legal effect.”).
3. Verkuil, supra note 1, at 257 (“[The] popularity [of the independent agency] as an
organizational mechanism is more a function of competing political forces within the
legislative and executive branches than of any systematic analysis of its effectiveness.”).
4. Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1803–04 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
5. See id. at 1770 (majority decision) (holding that the structure of the Federal Housing
Finance Agency, which was led by a single
Director who was not fireable at will, was unconstitutional as a violation of the
separation of powers).
6. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3152 (2009)
(“The landmark case of Myers v. United States reaffirmed the principle that Article II confers
on the President ‘the general administrative control of those executing the laws.’” (quoting
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 264 (1926)).
7. See id. (noting the President’s control over the executive branch).
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President’s removal power—is subject to limitations, especially when
aimed at those “independent agencies run by principal officers appointed
by the President, whom the President may not remove at will but only for
good cause.”8
As the name suggests, independent agencies are best
distinguished from other agencies of the executive branch by the fact of
their independence.9 This independence is promoted through statutory
schemes—e.g., requirements of bipartisan appointments, fixed terms of
service, and protections against removal—that are “designed to isolate
those decisionmakers [at independent agencies] from politics.”10 The
bipartisan appointment requirement—that independent agencies be led in
part by officials from a party that is not in power at the White House—
provides a check on sheer partisanship and power imbalances in decision
making.11 A term of years requirement for appointment staggers the
appointment of agency members across presidential terms.12 And,
critically, the removal protections serve to guard against an agency
member’s removal for purely political reasons.13
Independence is key to the success of financial regulators, who
make and enforce rules and regulatory law in their supervision of
financial institutions.14 Accordingly, many financial regulatory agencies
are independent agencies, including the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the
Federal Reserve (“Fed”), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA),
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). These agencies

8. Id. at 3146 (citing Humphrey's Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)).
9. Verkuil, supra note 1, at 259 (“The quality that most distinguishes independent
agencies from the executive variety is the notion of independence itself.”).
10. Id. at 259-60; see also Henry B. Hogue, Marc Labonte, & Baird Webel, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R43391, INDEPENDENCE OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATORS: STRUCTURE,
FUNDING, AND OTHER ISSUES
(2017),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R43391.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7CWM-6TKE] (noting funding source and balance between Congressional
and executive oversight as other distinguishing features of an independent agency’s
independence).
11. Verkuil, supra note 1, at 259-60.
12. Id. at 260.
13. Id.
14. See Hogue et al., supra note 10, at 3 (noting that “less responsiveness to
constituents and other political actors may be inevitable—or even desirable—when the goal
is to insulate an agency,” like financial regulatory agencies, from political pressures).
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are organized around the common characteristics of independent agencies
that insulate such agencies from political interference.15
One such characteristic is leadership structure.16 Namely, a single
director heads some independent agencies, like the CFPB and the FHFA,
which are critical to the regulation of the financial markets.17 In contrast,
multimember agencies or commissions, like the Federal Reserve’s Board
of Governors, the SEC, the CFTC, and the FDIC, are comprised of
several members and are headed by a chair.18 Through what Collins and
certain predecessor decisions say about single director agencies, they may
bear on multimember agencies.19
The Collins decision underscores that any single director of an
independent agency, including those regulating the financial markets,
must be removable by the President at will.20 But herein lies the issue:
how will the Court that decided Collins and its closely-related
predecessor case, Seila Law v. CFPB,21
view the so-called
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 1, at 259-60 (discussing removal protections as a key
factor of independence) and 265-66 (noting the increase in policymaking power held by
independent agency chairs over the years since such agencies’ conception).
17. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(1) (establishing a single Director of the CFPB); 12
U.S.C. § 4512(a), (b)(1) (establishing single Director of FHFA).
18. See, e.g, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (establishing the SEC “to be composed of five
commissioners to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate”); 5 U.S.C. app. Reorg. Plan No. 10 of 1950 § 1(a), 64 Stat. 1265 (establishing the
Chairman of the SEC); 7 U.S.C. § 2 (establishing “as an independent agency of the United
States Government, a Commodity Futures Trading Commission” and providing for the
selection, by the President, of a chair); 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a) (“The management of the [Federal
Deposit Insurance] Corporation shall be vested in a Board of Directors consisting of 5
members.”); 12 U.S.C. §1812(b) (providing that the President, with the “advice and consent
of the Senate,” shall select a member of the FDIC’s board to serve as “Chairperson of the
Board of Directors for a term of 5 years”).
19. Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1761 (2021) (“The Constitution prohibits even
‘modest restrictions’ on the President's power to remove the head of an agency with a single
top officer” (citing Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2205)); see also Joseph A. Smith, Jr., A Tale of
Two Agencies: The Travails of The CFPB and FHFA – Chapter 4: The Supreme Court
Decision in Collins v. Yellen (nee Mnuchin), DUKE FIN. REG. BLOG (June 25, 2021),
https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2021/06/25/a-tale-of-two-agencies-the-travails-ofthe-cfpb-and-fhfa-chapter-4-the-supreme-court-decision-in-collins-v-yellen-nee-mnuchin/
[https://perma.cc/7DCF-E5K2] (observing that the decisions in Collins and its predecessor
case, CFPB v. Seila Law, “require[e] that single agency heads be removable by the President
at will”).
20. See, e.g., Smith, Jr., supra note 19 (“Seila Law and Collins establish a judicially
legislated Constitutional framework for the structure of agencies formed to address future
crises: requiring that single agency heads be removable by the President at will and possibly
allowing the creation of independent multi-member commissions. Whether this framework
will serve the public interest remains to be seen.”).
21. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
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“independence” of independent multimember agencies that have
previously enjoyed some level of protection from presidential removal of
its members?22
For nearly 100 years, since Humphrey’s Executor v. Federal
Trade Commission,23 the President’s ability to remove members
(including heads) of independent multimember agencies has been
determined by whether the agency wields “quasi-judicial” or “quasilegislative” powers.24 “Quasi-judicial” or “quasi-legislative” powers are
those judicial or legislative powers exercised not by a court or a
legislative body, but rather by an executive agency.25 In Humphrey’s
Executor, the Court explained this distinction using the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) as an example.26 The FTC was “created by
Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the [FTC
Act of 1914] in accordance with the legislative standard therein
prescribed.”27 The FTC could also “perform other specified duties as a
legislative or as a judicial aid.”28 To the Court, the FTC could not “in any
proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive”
because it performed its duties without the approval or direction of the
President.29 The FTC acted “in part quasi[-]legislatively and in part
quasi[-]judicially” in executing on the “details” of the “general standard”
of preventing unfair trade practices.30 As the agency’s function wasn’t

22. See Smith, Jr., supra note 19 (noting Seila Law’s implications on agency
independence); Bernard W. Bell, The Appointment and Removal Litigation Ecosystem, REG.
REV. (July 27, 2021) https://www.theregreview.org/2021/07/27/bell-appointment-andremoval-litigation-ecosystem/ [https://perma.cc/N5PG-P4C5].
23. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
24. Id. at 629 (“The authority of Congress, in creating quasi[-]legislative or quasi[]judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of
executive control cannot well be doubted; and that authority includes, as an appropriate
incident, power to fix the period during which they shall continue, and to forbid their removal
except for cause in the meantime.”).
25. See id. at 628 (noting that “The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative
body . . . [which] acts in part quasi[-] legislatively and in part quasi[-]judicially . . . [t]o the
extent that it exercises any executive function . . . .”).
26. See id. (explaining the concepts of quasi-judical and quasi-legislative powers).
27. Id. at 628.
28. Id.
29. Id. (“Its duties are performed without executive leave and, in the contemplation of
the statute, must be free from executive control.”).
30. Id.
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fully “executive,” in the Court’s judgment, the President could not
remove its head at will.31
The same is true for any independent agency, in which an
agency’s members work together to exercise their collective expertise,
what the Supreme Court called “the trained judgment of a body of
experts.”32 Accordingly, the President is restrained from firing the
members at will and is only constitutionally permitted to remove
members for cause, as defined in the agency’s applicable enabling
statute.33 This protection ensures the “coercive” political influence of a
President with at-will removal powers over the members of an
independent commission or agency does not “threaten[] [its]
independence.”34
But the decision in Collins, in comparison to the Seila Law
decision, evinces a willingness to rethink the longstanding principle set
out in Humphrey’s Executor. In fact, the “language and logic” of these
cases suggests that “the agency decisional independence” in Humphrey’s
may be “skating on melting ice.”35 In meaningful part, Seila Law struck
down removal protections for the single director of the CFPB because
that Director exercised “significant executive power.”36 Collins, in
striking down removal protections for the single Director of the FHFA,
dispensed with the limiting principle of whether the agency exercised
“significant executive power.”37 Instead, the Court used an even broader
blade to cut the removal protections Congress had afforded the Director

31. Id. at 630 (“The power of removal here claimed for the President falls within this
principle, since its coercive influence threatens the independence of a commission, which is
not only wholly disconnected from the executive department, but which, as already fully
appears, was created by Congress as a means of carrying into operation legislative and judicial
powers, and as an agency of the legislative and judicial departments.”).
32. Id. at 624.
33. See id. at 629 (“The authority of Congress, in creating quasi[-]legislative or quasi[]judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of
executive control cannot well be doubted; and that authority includes . . . power to . . . forbid
their removal except for cause . . . .”).
34. Id. at 630.
35. Richard W. Murphy, The DIY Unitary Executive, 63 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 446, 468–
69 (2021).
36. Seila Law v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020) (“We are now asked to extend
[removal power precedents protecting independent agencies] to a new configuration: an
independent agency that wields significant executive power and is run by a single individual
who cannot be removed by the President unless certain statutory criteria are met. We decline
to take that step.”).
37. Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1801 (2021) (Kagan, J., concurring).
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of the FHFA.38 As Justice Kagan noted in her concurrence,39 after
Collins, any agency led by a single director, “no matter how much
executive power it wields, now becomes subject to the requirement of atwill removal.”40 Indeed, as the majority put it directly, after Collins, “the
nature and breadth of an agency's authority is not dispositive in
determining whether Congress may limit the President's power to remove
its head.”41
Ultimately, making sense of this case law requires answering one
question: what consequences are threatened for independent,
multimember agencies that regulate the financial markets by the
expansive rationale the Court employed in Collins? Put another way,
after Collins, what remains of the quasi-judicial/quasi-legislative test in
Humphrey’s Executor? This Note answers that question in six parts. Part
II recaps the Seila Law decision as setting the stage for Collins.42 Part III
discusses the Court’s decision in Collins, with a particular emphasis on
the question that case presented on the President’s removal power.43 Part
IV compares the reasoning of Humphrey’s Executor with that employed
by the Court in Collins and Seila Law and also draws on the relevant
reasoning employed in lower court decisions by the current Supreme
Court Justices.44 Part V, followed by a brief conclusion, applies the
reasoning of Seila Law and Collins to the statutory schemes of four key
financial regulatory agencies who each wield enforcement powers within
the structure of an independent agency—the Federal Reserve’s Board of
Governors, the SEC, the CFTC, and the FDIC—to show how future
challenges to these agencies’ structures, spurred by the reasoning of
Collins and its kin, may threaten the stability and independence of these
agencies, impacting regulators and financial professionals.45
II. SEILA LAW SETS THE STAGE

38. Id. at 1800-01 (noting her “objection . . . to the majority's extension of Seila Law’s
holding”).
39. Id. (disagreeing with the substance of the majority’ reasoning, but joining the
decision for purposes of stare decisis).
40. Id. at 1801.
41. Id. at 1784.
42. See infra Part II.
43. See infra Part III. This Note, in its limited scope, does not discuss the questions of
statutory authority and remedies raised in Collins.
44. See infra Part IV.
45. See infra Part V.
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The Background of Seila Law

Collins, decided in 2021, was the second case in as many years
challenging the constitutionality of a single agency head of an
independent agency.46 Before Collins, the Supreme Court had ruled in
2020’s Seila Law v. CFPB that the CFPB's leadership by a single director
removable only for cause—that is, “inefficiency, neglect, or
malfeasance”—was a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.47
Key to the Court’s ruling was its view that the CFPB was an “independent
agency that wields significant executive power.”48 The CFPB was given
that power from its inception.49
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, Congress created the
CFPB as part of the landmark Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act.50 The CFPB was charged with implementing
and enforcing consumer financial protection laws to “ensur[e] that all
consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and
services and that markets for consumer financial products and services
are fair, transparent, and competitive.”51
To execute this mission, the CFPB was given broad powers to
make rules, enforce those rules and other regulations, and conduct
adjudicatory and administrative proceedings.52 Indeed, the CFPB has
“the authority to conduct investigations, issue subpoenas and civil
investigative demands, initiate administrative adjudications, and
prosecute civil actions in federal court.”53 Through its administrative
proceedings, the CFPB can “ensure or enforce compliance with” the

46. Cf. Seila Law v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
47. Id. at 2197 (quoting 12 USC § 5491(c)(3)).
48. Id. at 2192 (emphasis added).
49. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) of
2010 § 1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (creating CFPB and vesting the agency with powers).
50. Id.; see also Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE
ARCHIVES (Oct. 17, 2021), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/economy/middleclass/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform [https://perma.cc/4PWP-BE9B] (describing Dodd-Frank
as “the most far reaching Wall Street reform in history” and aimed at “prevent[ing] the
excessive risk-taking that led to the [Global Financial Crisis]”).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a); see also Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2193 (“As an initial matter,
at its creation, the CFPB was charged with administering eighteen existing federal statutes,
including the Air Credit Reporting Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Truth
in Lending Act.” (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5512(a), 5481(12), (14))).
52. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5563(a) (generally describing the CFPB’s authority to hold
adjudicatory proceedings).
53. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2193 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5562, 5564(a), (f)).
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statutes and regulations it is charged to administer.54 The agency has the
“jurisdiction to grant any appropriate legal or equitable relief,” and the
power, through officers of the agency to “issue subpoenas, order
depositions, and resolve any motions filed by the parties.”55 These
enforcement powers would become the subject of the Seila Law
proceedings.
B.

The Seila Law Litigation

In 2017, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand (i.e., a
subpoena) to Seila Law, a California-based law firm that provides debtrelated legal services,56 to determine whether Seila Law had “engag[ed]
in unlawful acts or practices in the advertising, marketing, or sale of debt
relief services.”57 Seila Law refused to comply with the demand,
“objecting that the agency’s leadership by a single Director removable
only for cause violated the separation of powers.”58 The district court
disagreed and enforced the demand, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that
ruling.59
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the CFPB's
leadership by a single individual removable only for inefficiency, neglect,
or malfeasance violate[d] the separation of powers.”60 The cornerstone
of the Court’s ruling was the degree to which the “Director's enforcement
authority” was “a quintessentially executive power” beyond what the
members of independent agencies with removal protections should
possess.61
The Court detailed what it viewed as the significant scope and
strength of the powers that the CFPB possessed.62 As evidence of the
CFPB’s “potent enforcement powers,” the Court noted that “[s]ince its
inception, the CFPB has obtained over $11 billion in relief for over 25
million consumers, including a $1 billion penalty against a single bank in
54. 12 U.S.C. § 5563(a).
55. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2193 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(1) and 12 C.F.R. §
1081.104(b)(9)).
56. Id. at 2194.
57. CFPB v. Seila Law, 2017 WL 6536586, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017).
58. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2194.
59. CFPB v. Seila Law, 923 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2019), vacated and remanded, 140 S.
Ct. 2183 (2020).
60. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2197.
61. Id. at 2200.
62. Id. at 2193-94.
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2018.”63 Considering these powers and the CFPB’s success in wielding
them, the Court reasoned that “the CFPB Director is hardly a mere
legislative or judicial aid” as the members of an independent agency
might be.64 Instead, the Court reasoned that the CFPB Director
“possesses the authority to promulgate binding rules fleshing out 19
federal statutes,” including a broad prohibition on unfair and deceptive
practices in a major segment of the U.S. economy.65
While the fact of the CFPB’s single Director, unchecked by other
commissioners, loomed large in the Court’s reasoning, the Seila Law
ruling presumably established a new conjunctive test for whether the
members or chairs of an independent agency could receive removal
protections: “Humphrey's Executor permitted Congress to give for-cause
removal protections to a multimember body of experts, balanced along
partisan lines, that performed legislative and judicial functions and was
said not to exercise any executive power.”66 In sum, the protections
extend to independent agencies that meet four criteria: (1) a multimember
body of experts, (2) balanced along partisan lines, (3) performing
legislative and judicial functions, and (4) not exercising any executive
power in the “constitutional sense” (that is, exercising the executive’s
power to enforce the laws).67 Seila Law propped open the door for a new
conception of independent agency removal powers to walk through.
Justice Kagan’s concurrence helps to articulate this new
conception of removal power, one that to her was “wrong in every
respect.”68 To her, the issue was not about single directors or
multimember agencies: “[i]f a removal provision violates the separation
of powers, it is because the measure so deprives the President of control
over an official as to impede his own constitutional functions.”69 The
majority’s decision, dragging the CFPB’s leadership structure into a net
of unconstitutionality, abrogated the authority of Congress to “enact[]

63. Id. at 2193 (citing 2015 CFPB FIN. REP. 3; Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Announces Settlement with Wells Fargo
for Auto-Loan Administration and Mortgage Practices (Apr. 20, 2018),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bureau-consumer-financialprotection-announces-settlement-wells-fargo-auto-loan-administration-and-mortgagepractices/).
64. Id. at 2200.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2199.
67. Id. at 2198 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. FTC, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935)).
68. Id. at 2255 (Kagan, J., concurring).
69. Id.
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measures to create spheres of administration—especially of financial
affairs—detached from direct presidential control.”70 The next year, the
majority decision in Collins would widen that net.
III. COLLINS CREATES BROADER REMOVAL POWERS FOR THE PRESIDENT
A.

The Creation of the FHFA

In 2021, the Court again considered whether a single agency
Director, removable only “for cause,” violated the separation of powers
between Congress and the President.71 Drawing on the Seila Law
decision, which was “all but dispositive” of the issue, the Court in Collins
held that the Housing and Economy Recovery Act of 2008’s “for-cause
restriction” on the President’s authority to remove the Director of the
FHFA “violate[d] the separation of powers.”72
Congress created the Federal National Mortgage Association
(“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(“Freddie Mac”) in the mid-twentieth century to bolster the health of the
United States’ home mortgage market.73 These companies are for-profit
corporations and are owned by private shareholders.74 By purchasing
mortgages and pooling them into mortgage-backed securities which are
sold to investors, the companies “relieve mortgage lenders of the risk of
default and free up their capital to make more loans.”75 This freerflowing capital “increases the liquidity and stability of America’s home
lending market” and “promotes access” to credit for homebuyers.76 Over
time, this proved a successful strategy: in 2007, on the cusp of the Global
Financial Crisis of 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had combined
portfolios valued at $5 trillion, which represented nearly half of the
country’s mortgage market.77 However, that portfolio was hit hard as the
70. Id. at 2225.
71. Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1770 (2021).
72. Id. at 1783.
73. See id. at 1771 (citing National Housing Act Amendments of 1938, ch. 13, 52 Stat.
8, 23, 12 U.S.C. § 1717(a)(1) (creating Fannie Mae); Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 303, 84 Stat. 450, 451 (1970), 12 U.S.C. § 1452(a)(1)
(creating Freddie Mac)).
74. See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 § 801, 82 Stat. 536, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1716b (“[The] Federal National Mortgage Association[] will be a . . . private corporation .
. . .”); 12 U.S.C. § 1452(a)(1) (establishing Freddie Mac as a private corporation).
75. Jacobs v. FHFA, 908 F.3d 884, 887 (3d Cir. 2018).
76. Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1771.
77. Id. at 1771.
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crisis unfolded: in 2008, the companies lost more than they had earned
in the prior 27 years.78
Congress responded to this 2008 crisis to protect the future of
America’s housing market.79 Through the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”),80 Congress gave the Treasury the
power to purchase stock at any time from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
to benefit the financial and housing markets.81 But perhaps more
consequentially, Congress also created the FHFA,82 which was
empowered to take a broad set of actions to regulate Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.83 The products of Congress’ response were disputed in
Collins more than a decade later.84
B.

FHFA’s Enforcement Power and Conservatorships

Under HERA, the FHFA was to be led by a single Director,
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.85 That Director
would serve a five-year term, but he or she could be removed by the
President “for cause.”86 As the Collins Court put it, the FHFA, under the
Director’s leadership, was “tasked with supervising nearly every aspect
of the companies’ management and operations.”87 The scope of that
supervision was broad, encompassing powers to control transfers to the
companies and the offloading of the companies’ assets, mandate

78. FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., WPR-2013-002, ANALYSIS OF
THE 2012 AMENDMENTS TO THE SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENTS 5 (2013),
https://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/WPR-2013-002_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3GED9QVC] (“In 2008, Fannie Mae lost $58.7 billion and Freddie Mac lost $50.1 billion. To put
these losses in perspective, over the 37-year period from 1971 to mid-year 2008, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac together earned $95 billion, less than they lost in 2008 alone.”).
79. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–289,
122 Stat. 2654 (addressing the fallout from the Global Recession).
80. Id.
81. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455(l)(1), 1719(g)(1).
82. 12 U.S.C. § 4511(b) (establishing the FHFA).
83. 12 U.S.C. § 4502(20) (defining which entities would be regulated by FHFA and
including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in that definition). The FHFA replaced The Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”), the regulatory body that previously
oversaw Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See FHFA Timeline, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY,
https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Timeline [https://perma.cc/3FQW-8SRH].
84. See Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1771 (2021).
85. 12 U.S.C. § 4512(a), (b)(1).
86. 12 U.S.C. § 4512(b)(2).
87. Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1771.
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reporting, conduct on-site inspections, and hire additional third-party
firms to perform further reviews.88
Furthermore, that oversight and regulatory authority included the
power to serve as the companies’ conservator and take all actions
“necessary to put [either of the companies] regulated entity in a sound
and solvent condition.”89 Under the conservatorship, the FHFA would
be charged with controlling and directing the operations of the
companies, keeping them in “safe and solvent financial condition.”90 As
conservator, the FHFA could: (1) “take over the assets of and operate
[the companies] with all the powers of the shareholders, the directors, and
the officers of the [companies] and conduct all [the companies’]
business;” (2) “collect all obligations and money due to the [companies];”
(3) “perform all functions of the [companies] which are consistent with
the Conservator’s appointment;” (4) “preserve and conserve the assets
and property of the [companies];” and (5) “contract for assistance in
fulfilling any function, activity, action or duty of the Conservator.”91
The FHFA put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship
in September of 2008, less than two months after HERA was enacted and
in the midst of a global financial meltdown.92 Immediately, FHFA and
the Treasury went to work flexing the powers that HERA had given them:
the FHFA entered into purchase agreements with the Treasury, which

88. Id. at 1771-72 (“For example, the Agency must approve any new products that the
companies would like to offer. [12 U.S.C.] § 4541(a). It may reject acquisitions and certain
transfers of interests the companies seek to execute. § 4513(a)(2)(A). It establishes criteria
governing the companies’ portfolio holdings. § 4624(a). It may order the companies to
dispose of or acquire any asset. § 4624(c). It may impose caps on how much the companies
compensate their executives and prohibit or limit golden parachute and indemnification
payments. § 4518. It may require the companies to submit regular reports on their condition
or ‘any other relevant topics.’ § 4514(a)(2). And it must conduct one on-site examination of
the companies each year and may, on any terms the Director deems appropriate, hire outside
firms to perform additional reviews. §§ 4517(a)–(b), 4519.”).
89. 12 U.S.C § 4617(b)(2)(D) (giving the Director of the FHFA the authority to put a
regulated entity, including Fannie Mae and/or Freddie Mac, into conservatorship). When
acting as a conservator, the FHFA can “take control of a regulated entity's assets and
operations, conduct business on its behalf, and transfer or sell any of its assets or liabilities.”
Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1776.
90. Questions and Answers on Conservatorship, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, 1 (Sept. 15,
2020),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/fhfa_consrv_faq_090708hp1128.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJP4-BXFJ].
91. Id. at 2.
92. Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1772.
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exercised its authority to buy the companies’ stock.93 Pursuant to these
agreements, the Treasury would provide Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
each with up to $100 billion in capital, a kind of cash reserve on which
the companies could draw in any quarter “in which its liabilities exceeded
its assets.”94 In return, the Treasury received one million shares of senior
preferred stock in each company, specially created to help facilitate this
deal.95
As holder of those shares, the Treasury had four key entitlements,
each of which stood to enrich the Treasury or protect its investments in
the companies.96 First, the Treasury received a senior liquidation
preference equal to $1 billion in each company, with a dollar-for-dollar
increase every time the company drew on the capital commitment. In
other words, in the event the FHFA liquidated Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac, the Treasury would have the right to be paid back $1 billion, as well
as whatever amount the company had already drawn from the capital
commitment, before any other investors or shareholders could seek
repayment.97 Second, the Treasury was given warrants, or long-term
options, to purchase up to 79.9% of the companies’ common stock at a
nominal price.98 Third, the Treasury became entitled to a quarterly
periodic commitment fee, which the companies would pay to compensate
the Treasury for the support provided by the ongoing access to capital.99
Finally, the companies were obligated to pay the Treasury quarterly cash
dividends at an annualized rate equal to 10% of the Treasury's
outstanding liquidation preference.100

93. See Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement Between
the United States Department of the Treasury and the Federal National Mortgage Association
FED.
HOUS.
FIN.
AUTH.
(Sept.
26,
2008),
https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Documents/Senior-Preferred-StockAgree/FNM/SPSPA-amends/FNM-Amend-and-Restated-SPSPA_09-26-2008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6GQ-7YM9]; Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreement Between the United States Department of the Treasury and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY (Sept. 26, 2008),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/seniorpreferredstock
purchaseagreementfrea.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX4S-US4Z].
94. Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1771-72.
95. Id. at 1773.
96. See id. (listing the Treasury’s entitlements and explaining how each would return
funds to the government).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. (explaining how the money the companies drew from Treasury would be
owed back, leading to more borrowing).
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As they entered financial recovery, these companies drew more
money from the Treasury in the years that followed. Because they paid
the Treasury a fixed-rate dividend, a vicious cycle began.101 The more
money the companies drew from Treasury, the more they owed back, to
the point that they would draw money from Treasury just to pay back a
previous year’s dividend.102
Seeking to end this cycle, the FHFA and Treasury amended the
stock purchase agreement a final time in 2012.103 This amendment
created the “Net Worth Sweep”: if, at the end of a quarter, the net worth
of either of the companies exceeded its capital reserve, the company
would be required to pay that surplus back to the Treasury, sweeping the
excess net worth back to the Treasury.104 “But if a company's net worth
at the end of a quarter did not exceed the reserve or if it lost money during
a quarter, the amendment did not require the company to pay
anything.”105 After this amendment, the companies’ financial health
improved.106 The agreement was amended one last time in January of
2021 to the terms currently in effect.107 This most recent change
“suspends the companies’ quarterly dividend payments until they build
up enough capital to meet certain specified thresholds,” which could take
several years.”108
In 2016, shareholders of the companies brought suit seeking
various forms of relief and return of dividend payments, further alleging
that the FHFA had exceeded its statutory authority by enacting the Net
Worth Sweep.109 The shareholders also alleged a more fundamental flaw:
that the leadership structure of the FHFA was unconstitutional.110
C.

The Collins Litigation

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1774.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Letters from S. Mnuchin, Secretary of Treasury, to M. Calabria,
Director of the FHFA (Jan. 14, 2021)).
108. Id. at 1775.
109. See id. at 1775 (describing shareholders’ cause of action).
110. Id. (“[Petitioners] asked for various forms of equitable relief, including a
declaration that the third amendment [enacting the Net Worth Sweep] violated the Recovery
Act and that the FHFA's structure is unconstitutional.”).
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As many predicted, given the similarity between the leadership
structure of the FHFA and that of the CFPB challenged in Seila Law, and
under the force of the bright-line ruling in Seila Law,111 the Court in
Collins held that the single Director structure of the FHFA was an
unconstitutional encroachment on the President’s authority in violation
of the separation of powers.112 Indeed, to the Court, “[a] straightforward
application of Seila Law’s reasoning dictate[d] the result . . . .”113
But critically, the Court seemed to expand its ruling from Seila
Law: nowhere was there mention of the “significant executive power”
that had been the fatal flaw in the structure of CFPB.114 Instead, the Court
reasoned that “the nature and breadth of an agency's authority is not
dispositive in determining whether Congress may limit the President's
power to remove its head.”115 Collins took a sharper approach: because
the “removal power helps the President maintain a degree of control over
the subordinates he needs to carry out his duties as the head of the
Executive Branch, and it works to ensure that these subordinates serve
the people effectively and in accordance with the policies that the people
presumably elected the President to promote,” removal power is
“essential to subject Executive Branch actions to a degree of electoral
accountability.”116 Simply, as the Court put it, “the Constitution prohibits
even ‘modest restrictions’ on the President's power to remove the head of
an agency with a single top officer,” and so the removal protections for
the Director of the FHFA were struck down as unconstitutional.117
111. See, e.g., Jackson S. Freeman, Removal for Cause: Seila Law and the Future of
the CFPB and FHFA, 25 N.C. BANKING INST. 367 (2021) (predicting that the holding in Seila
Law likely meant the Court would find the FHFA’s single Director unconstitutional when
taking up the issue in Collins).
112. See Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1784 (announcing holding).
113. Id.
114. Cf. Seila Law v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020) (declining to extend removal
protections to the Director of the CFPB and noting that the CFPB “wields significant
executive power”).
115. Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1784.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1787 (quoting Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2205). If the Collins majority decision
picked up where Seila Law’s left off, so did Justice Kagan’s concurrence. Justice Kagan noted
that the majority decision “careen[ed] right past” the “boundary line” of “significant executive
power” that had been so crucial to the Seila Law decision. Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1801 (Kagan,
J., concurring). “Without even mentioning Seila Law’s significant executive power framing,”
Justice Kagan alleged, the majority “announce[d] . . . that the constitutionality of removal
restrictions does not hinge on the nature and breadth of an agency's authority. Id. To be sure,
the majority took care to hang its ruling on the fact that the FHFA was led by a single agency
Director. See id. at 1784 (majority opinion). But something more underpinned the decision,
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IV. THE COLLINS DECISION CALLS INTO QUESTION THE LEADERSHIP
STRUCTURE OF MULTIMEMBER AGENCIES
Under Collins, a single director of an independent agency can be
fired at will despite a statutory provision providing removal only for
cause.118 The question then is: how might the Supreme Court rule on
removal only for cause of independent multimember agency members?
A.

The Removal Ecosystem

Humphrey’s Executor119 exists within what scholars have dubbed
“the removal litigation ecosystem” of Supreme Court precedent
concerning independent agencies.120 Ten years prior to the decision in
Humphrey’s Executor, Myers v. United States121 provided that as a
general proposition, the President may remove executive branch officials
that he or she nominates and the Senate confirms—in that case, a
Postmaster in Oregon—without the consent of the legislature.122 This
ruling undergirded the later decision in Humphrey’s that created the
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative exceptions to this power.123 Where
Myers provided an outer bound of the President’s absolute power, a 1957
case, Wiener v. United States,124 set an absolute restriction on that
power.125 In that case, the Court held that President Eisenhower could
not remove a member of the War Claims Commission because of the
commission’s “intrinsic judicial character.”126 In sum, it is this
“ecosystem” of cases that Seila Law and Collins may disrupt, and
members of the Court have expressed openness to spurring that
disruption.127
too—the majority’s view that “[a]t-will removal ensures that the lowest officers, the middle
grade, and the highest, will depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on the
community.” Id. at 1784.
118. See id. at 1770 (concluding that “the FHFA's structure [of a single Director
fireable only for cause] violates the separation of powers”).
119. See also supra Part I (laying out basic principles of removal power derived from
Humphrey’s Executor).
120. Bell, supra note 22.
121. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
122. Id. at 121-22.
123. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).
124. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
125. Id. at 353-54.
126. Id. at 355.
127. Bell, supra note 22; see also discussion infra Sections IV.B-D. (noting the
jurisprudence of current Justices of the Supreme Court).
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Justice Thomas’s Hardline View

As an initial matter, some Justices seem fully willing to overturn
any removal protections for independent agencies.128 In his concurrence
in Seila Law, Justice Thomas wrote that the “decision in Humphrey's
Executor poses a direct threat to our constitutional structure, and, as a
result, the liberty of the American people.”129 Noting that the Seila Law
decision “repudiated almost every aspect of Humphrey's Executor,”
Justice Thomas offered that he would “repudiate what is left of this
erroneous precedent” when given a future opportunity.130 He did so with
his vote in Collins, joining the majority decision in full.131
C.

Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh—Agencies as Encroachment
on Liberty

The Gorsuch concurrence in Collins evinces a similar distrust for
the removal protections of independent agencies.132 To Justice Gorsuch,
“removal restrictions may be a greater constitutional evil than
appointment defects, [because] new Presidents always inherit thousands
of Executive Branch officials whom they did not select.”133 Accordingly,
at-will removal power “allows a new President to shape his
administration and respond to the electoral will that propelled him to
office.”134 This is because, in his view, “[f]ew things could be more
perilous to liberty than some ‘fourth branch’ that does not answer even to
the one executive official who is accountable to the body politic”135 In
examining how a future Court may rule on the removal protections of
independent agencies, it is difficult to read this as anything but a signal
that the Court is willing to reconsider the protections insulating
multimember agency directors from at-will firing.
Then-Judge Kavanaugh’s emphatic dissent in the D.C. Circuit’s
PHH Corp. v. CFPB also reflects his serious doubts about for-cause
128. See Seila Law v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2212 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(writing that he would “repudiate what is left” of Humphrey’s Executor).
129. Id. at 2211.
130. Id. at 2212.
131. See Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1789 (Thomas, J., concurring).
132. See id. at 1796-97 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (expressing concerns over what he
views as improper removal restrictions).
133. Id at 1796.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1797.
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removal structures for agency heads, even for those commissioners who
together collectively lead multimember agencies.136 As he expressed in
the dissent:
The independent agencies collectively constitute, in
effect, a headless fourth branch of the U.S. Government.
They hold enormous power over the economic and social
life of the United States. Because of their massive power
and the absence of Presidential supervision and direction,
independent agencies pose a significant threat to
individual liberty and to the constitutional system of
separation of powers and checks and balances.137
Judge Kavanaugh did note that multimember “independent
agencies do not concentrate all power in one unaccountable individual,
but instead divide and disperse power across multiple commissioners or
board members.”138 However, he was also clear in his view that those
agencies “such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission . . . exercise[e] substantial executive
authority”—the same level of executive authority that proved fatal to
removal protections in Seila Law.139
D.

What This Might Mean for the Court’s Jurisprudence on
Removal Powers Moving Forward

There are three current Justices of the Supreme Court on record
with their severe doubts as to the constitutionality of removal protections
for heads of independent agencies.140 Adding Chief Justice Roberts, who
wrote for the majority in Seila Law, and Justice Alito, who wrote for the
majority in Collins, provides a possible five votes before even counting

136. See PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), abrogated by Seila Law v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (taking
aim at the “headless fourth branch” of government).
137. Id. at 165.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 164.
140. See supra Sections IV.B-C.
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Justice Barrett, who joined the Court’s decision in Collins141 but whose
fuller views on the topic are less well known.142 This shift in the Court’s
thinking, as reflected in the views of its members, may indeed have
implications for all independent agencies, including the financial
regulatory agencies.
V. SYNTHESIZING THE PRINCIPLES FROM COLLINS TO PREDICT HOW THE
SUPREME COURT MIGHT RULE ON MULTIMEMBER AGENCIES IN THE
FUTURE
Three key independent financial regulatory agencies may be
severely disrupted by this trend in the Court’s jurisprudence.143 As noted
previously, independent agencies vested with powers of financial
regulation are meant to give the public confidence that financial policy is
not subject to the whims of “political expediency.”144 This may no longer
be the case.
A.

Impact on the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors (“BOG”)

The Fed’s BOG structure bears the hallmarks of an independent
agency. For example, the seven-member BOG is comprised of members,
or governors, who are nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate to staggered fourteen-year terms.145 Consideration is given to the

141. 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021).
142. See President Trump Nominates Judge Amy Coney Barrett: Initial Observations,
CONG.
RSCH.
SERV.
2
(Sept.
28,
2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10540 [https://perma.cc/4T7Y-4ZWL]
(“Because she became a judge in 2017, she has written fewer decisions, concurrences, and
dissents compared to other recent nominees who served on the bench for several additional
years. And although her scholarly publications expound theories of constitutional and
statutory interpretation, her engagement with these topics from an academic standpoint does
not necessarily predict whether she would adopt any particular methodology as a Supreme
Court Justice.”).
143. See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at 3, Collins, 141 S. Ct. 1781 (No.
19-422) (“If the Court were to hold that the FHFA’s structure violates the Constitution,
moreover, the repercussions would extend far beyond this case. Other features of the Federal
Government— including the Federal Reserve and the Civil Service— would also be
vulnerable to attack.”).
144. Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1803–04 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
145. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System . . .
shall be composed of seven members, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, after August 23, 1935, for terms of fourteen years except as
hereinafter provided.”).

128

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 26

geographic distribution and professional experience of the governors.146
The Chair and Vice-Chair are appointed to four-year terms, serving
concurrently with their terms as governors.147
But within this structure of an independent agency, the BOG
wields severe enforcement power. For example, through its Section 19
Letters (named after section 19 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act),148
the BOG publicizes individuals who have been “convicted of any
criminal offense involving dishonesty or a breach of trust or money
laundering, or ha[ve] agreed to enter into a pretrial diversion or similar
program in connection with a prosecution for such offense,” and, pending
prior regulatory or judicial approval, prohibits those individuals from
“participat[ing], directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of any
insured depository institution.”149 Moreover, the BOG, through the
Federal Reserve’s enforcement actions, can issue civil money penalties
to violative entities, including banks and other institutions but also
individuals.150 Standing against the rather modest enforcement powers
of the FHFA, a future Court might see the BOG as a body of an
independent agency wielding executive power and thus find removal
protections for its members unconstitutional, as it did in Collins.151
B.

Impact on the SEC

The SEC is comprised of five Commissioners, appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, from which a chair

146. Id.
147. Id. § 242.
148. Id. § 1829.
149. Id. (describing the Federal Reserve’s enforcement powers against individuals);
see also Enforcement Actions, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS. (June 2, 2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/enforcement-actions-about.htm
[https://perma.cc/F7EJ-D6NB] (“Generally, the Federal Reserve takes formal enforcement
actions against the above entities and individuals for violations of laws, rules, or regulations,
unsafe or unsound practices, breaches of fiduciary duty, and violations of final orders.”).
150. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 504 (providing for the assessment of civil money penalties
for violative institutions and individuals).
151. Cf. Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1776, 1784 (noting that a “straightforward”
application of Seila Law required striking down removal protections, as “removal power helps
the President maintain a degree of control over the subordinates he needs to carry out his
duties as the head of the Executive Branch, and it works to ensure that these subordinates
serve the people effectively and in accordance with the policies that the people presumably
elected the President to promote”).
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is selected.152 The President is free to name a new chair from the
members at any time.153 But the Court has also reasoned that “[t]he
Commission's powers . . . are generally vested in the Commissioners
jointly, not the Chairman alone,” and “[a]s a constitutional matter,” has
noted that a multimember body can itself be the head of a “department
that it governs.”154 If the President must have the ability to remove
agency members to “maintain a degree of control over the subordinates
he needs to carry out his duties as the head of the Executive Branch,”155
then it may follow that under Collins, the Commission members, each
comprising a part of the collective “department head,” must be removable
at-will and not protected by the statutory term of years for which they are
appointed.156
Furthermore, the SEC has enforcement powers through formal
investigations like those of the CFPB, highlighted by the Court in Seila
Law.157 Commission staff members, including lawyers, accountants,
analysts, and investigators, can all be designated “officers of the
Commission” to conduct a formal investigation.158 The SEC can enforce
its subpoenas through court order, and noncompliant witnesses can be
held in contempt.159 Both in informal and formal SEC investigations,
witnesses have the right to be represented by counsel and invoke their
Fifth Amendment rights.160
If all SEC Commissioners are functionally “heads” of the
Commission, and if the Commission has major enforcement powers,
those heads seem to be exercising the “significant executive power” that
was so crucial in Seila Law.161 It is hard to see how the protections once
152. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (establishing the SEC “to be composed of five
commissioners to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate”); 5 U.S.C. app. Reorg. Plan No. 10 of 1950 §1(a), 64 Stat. 1265 (establishing the
Chairman of the SEC).
153. Id.
154. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010).
155. Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1784.
156. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (noting that each member is collectively part of the head).
157. See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2193 (“Congress . . . vested the CFPB with potent
enforcement powers.”).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Enforcement Manual, SEC DIV. OF ENF’T (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JN8S73K6].
161. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 78d, and 5 U.S.C. app. Reorg. Plan No. 10 of 1950 §1(b)(1),
64 Stat. 1265 (describing the powers of the SEC at its inception) with Seila Law v. CFPB, 140

130

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 26

enforced under Humphrey’s Executor apply in light of the SEC’s
structure, authority, and the holding in Collins. The enforcement powers
of the SEC run directly into the teeth of the jurisprudence of the Justices
willing to strip members of multimember agencies of removal
protections.162
B.

Impact on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”)

The CFTC has a structure like that of the SEC and commensurate
enforcement powers.163 In fact, the results of the Seila Law and Collins
line of decisions likely bear out for the CFTC almost exactly like they do
for the SEC.164
But even those restrictions may fall under the new Seila LawCollins conception of removal power. Simply put, if a President must be
able to remove the members of multimember agencies that wield
significant executive power through enforcement tools like those of the
SEC or Federal Reserve’s BOG, it follows that the term of years
protection—which provides that a Commissioner has a fixed term—
would be feckless against that prerogative.165 Though the partisan
balance requirements may be even more important than the term of years
protections,166 those, too, would encroach upon the President’s ability to
remove agency members at will. Perhaps the President could remove a
Commissioner notwithstanding a statutory term of years, but the next
nominee would need to comply with partisan balance requirements. At
bottom, if the President must be able to fire at will, his or her will would

S. Ct. 2183, 2191 (2020) (describing the powers given to the CFPB by odd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act).
162. Compare discussion infra Sections IV.B-D. (noting the jurisprudence of current
Justices of the Supreme Court) with Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2191 (2020) (describing the
powers given to the CFPB by odd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act).
163. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A) (establishing the CFTC as an independent agency,
providing for the selection of its chair by the President, of a chair, restricting the
Commission’s partisan composition, and describing the five-year term limit for
Commissioners).
164. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78 with 7 U.S.C. § 2.
165. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §1812(b) (providing that the President, with the “advice and
consent of the Senate,” shall select a member of the FDIC’s board to serve as “Chairperson
of the Board of Directors for a term of 5 years”).
166. For a discussion of the exact importance of partisan balance within independent
agencies, see generally Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (2018).
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be the only removal protection.167 A President may be able to shape these
regulatory agencies to his or her will in a way not previously seen,
introducing unpredictability—and perhaps even uncertainty—into a
regulatory environment that relies on consistency and expertise.168
C.

Impact on the FDIC

The FDIC has a five-member board of directors. Of the five
members, two are the CFPB Director and Comptroller of the Currency.169
The remaining three members, including the Chairman, are appointed by
the president and serve six-year terms.170 There is a partisan balance
requirement; no more than three of the five Board members may be from
the same political party.171
The FDIC would be disrupted both by the effects on its own
statutory structure and the second-hand effects from the changes that have
already come to the removal protections (or lack thereof) for the CFPB
and FHFA.172 This is because the FDIC’s membership is determined in
part by that of other agencies, with director seats reserved for other
agency heads, including the CFPB Director.173
VI. WHAT MIGHT MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES SEILA LAW AND COLLINS
HAVE FOR REMOVAL POWERS?

167. But for countervailing forces, see infra Part V.
168. See Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1804 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“Congress has granted financial regulators such independence in
order to bolster public confidence that financial policy is guided by long-term thinking, not
short-term political expediency.”).
169. 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1).
170. Id.
171. Todd Phillips, The Impacts of Seila Law Beyond Consumer Finance, DUKE FIN.
REG.
BLOG
(Sept.
30,
2020)
(citing
12
U.S.C.
§
1812(a)(2)),
https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2020/07/09/the-impacts-of-seila-law-beyondconsumer-finance/ [https://perma.cc/Q8CD-4QD9].
172. 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)-(b) (vesting the FDIC’s management in a five-member Board
of Directors, with one member selected by the President to serve as “Chairperson of the Board
of Directors for a term of 5 years”).
173. See 12 U.S.C. § 1812. In full, two are the CFPB Director and OCC Comptroller
of the Currency, respectively. The remaining three members, including the Chairman, are
appointed by the president and serve six-year terms. There is a partisan balance requirement;
no more than three of the five Board members may be from the same political party.
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Where the President flexes new-found power, Congress may act
in response.174 Scholars have noted that while “statutory restrictions on
presidential removal may not be long for this world,” Congress’s “antiremoval power” would allow for some agency independence.175 The
source of that anti-removal power—that is, the power of Congress to push
back against a President’s imprudent removal of an independent agency’s
director—is in the Constitutional scheme that gives Congress a check on
the President’s appointments.176
One source of that power is the Appointments Clause, which
allows the Senate to influence presidential appointments by requiring
Senate confirmation for certain executive branch officers nominated by
the President.177 Because the Senate must confirm a President’s nominee
to a position requiring such approval, the Senate wields influence over
appointments. But this has second order effects, too: the President may
think twice—“rationally hesitate before firing the incumbent in the first
place.”178 And it is not just the Senate that holds this power—
impeachment is another removal power held by the House, and indeed,
even James Madison recognized that “the anti-removal power belongs to
Congress as a whole.”179
Appropriately, some scholars argue that “grounding [agency]
independence in Congress’s anti-removal power would further political
accountability.”180 It seems fitting that this flex of power by Congress
would achieve the same goals which animate the reasoning of the
Supreme Court Justices who wish to do away with agency
independence—creating “political consequences” for how the President
and Congress exercise their powers in the realm of appointments and
174. See Aaron Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Congress's Anti-Removal Power 1
(Ohio St. Legal Stud. Rsch., Working Paper No. 662, 2021) https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3941605 [https://perma.cc/5AGA-AGUL].
175. Id. at 4.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 11 (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 1).
178. Id. at 4 (“This dynamic effect was known to the framers; indeed, Alexander
Hamilton identified it in the Federalist as one of the Appointments Clause’s great—albeit
“silent”—benefits.”).
179. Id. at 5; see also 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 517-18 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (quoting
remarks of James Madison, June 17, 1789) (“[T]he president can displace from office a man
whose merits require that he should be continued in it. What will be the motives which the
president can feel for such abuse of his power, and the restraints that operate to prevent it? In
the first place, he will be impeachable by this house, before the senate, for such an act of
maladministration; for I contend that the wanton removal of meritorious officers would
subject him to impeachment and removal from his own high trust.”).
180. Nielson & Walker, supra note 174, at 9.
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removal.181 In that way, “Congress’s anti-removal power . . . provides a
political solution to a political problem.”182
VII. CONCLUSION
The Collins decision has foreclosed any independent agency
being headed by a single Director who may be removed only for cause.
But one can follow that reasoning to a conclusion that may disturb what
had been settled law about the independence and removal protections of
multimember agencies: there is enough “smoke” around the Court’s
thinking concerning the removal power of the President to think that there
might be a “fire.” Indeed, even the heads of those independent agencies,
appointed for terms and allegedly “independent” from the executive,
could also be removed by the President at will before the expiration of
their statutory term.
Seila Law set the table for the Collins decision that sounded the
final death knell for a single agency director removable only for-cause.
Now, all single directors must be removable at will. This leaves an open
question about whether heads of multimember independent agencies
must also be removable at will or whether they will enjoy their position
for the term specified by statute, perhaps serving under the President from
a different party than the President who appointed them. Previously, the
Court seemed concerned with the function of the agency – e.g.,
Humphrey’s Executor and the quasi-legislative/quasi-judicial divide.
Now, however, the Court seems concerned with the form – is it
an independent agency, and if so, does that agency hold enforcement
powers? If the President has some control over this agency with
enforcement powers, says one reading of the Court’s thinking, he or she
should have all control, and that means directors who may be removed at
will.
Statutory changes could also help to introduce more certainty into
the regulatory environment around independent agencies. The statutes
establishing the SEC, CFTC, and FDIC are silent on removal
protections,183 so it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the Court will
interpret them to suggest for-cause removal. In turn, those statutes will
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Because there is a term of years provision in the statute, the assumption is that a
board member would serve out his or her term absent removal for cause. See Verkuil, supra
note 1, at 260.
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be held to the Seila Law-Collins framework that seems primed to fire off
future decisions granting the President the power to remove at-will
members of multimember agencies which exercise serious enforcement
powers. Any difference between independent agencies and true
executive agencies may be nominal.
Such removal power, animated by the unpredictability of politics,
would threaten the predictability that financial markets—and the
professionals who comprise them—so highly value.184 At bottom,
financial professionals should know that the independent agencies of the
last century may be less independent moving forward, but Congress can
push back through impeachment, refusal to confirm nominees, or
otherwise frustrating a President’s agenda in an effort to guard against
this expansion of the President’s removal powers.
ADAM C. GILLETTE*

184. See, e.g,, Charles W. Tyler & E. Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability
Clauses, 124 YALE L.J. 2286, 2306 (2015) (“Predictability benefits both agencies and
regulated entities by encouraging efficient investment.”); CPR BLOG (Mar. 2, 2016)
http://progressivereform.org/cpr-blog/senate-republicans-flip-flop-on-the-white-house-andindependent-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/489W-JPXP] (“Those who follow the U.S.
regulatory system know that White House interference in agency regulatory decision-making
is a common and undesirable feature of the rulemaking process.”). But see generally Dan
Awrey & Kathryn Judge, Why Financial Regulation Keeps Falling Short, 61 B.C. L. REV.
2295 (2020) (arguing that “the procedural checks on lawmaking meant to promote
accountability and legitimacy often fail to further either end” and why [t]he mismatch between
the nature of finance and how finance is regulated helps to explain why financial regulation
has failed in the past and why it will likely fail again”).
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